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STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,

i

Plaintiff/Appellant,
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BRIAN LYNN ENGLEHORN,

Jj

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 930707-CA

Priority No. 15

;

BRIEF OF APPELLANT BARBARA LYNN BUNCH

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (1992).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's order entitled,
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice.

The district court ordered

that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice and on the
merits and that defendant be allowed to request attorney fees.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in holding that Utah Code Ann. §

30-1-4.5(2) (1989), requires one seeking a common law marriage to
obtain an order to that effect within one year of the separation.
2.

Did the trial court err in not concluding that one's

filing of a complaint within one year of the separation tolls the
limiting language of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989).
3.
because

Is Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989) unconstitutional
it violates

the

open

courts

provision

of

the

Utah

Constitution, Article I, section 11.
4.

Is Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989) unconstitutional

because it violates one's right to due process under the Utah
Constitution, Article I, section 7.
5.

Did the court err in ruling that defendant may seek

attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5
Validity of marriage not solemnized
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order
establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting
parties who:
(a)
(b)

are capable of giving consent;
are legal capable of entering a solemnized marriage
under the provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations;
and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform
and general reputation as husband and wife.

2

(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under
this section must occur during the relationship described in
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of
that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the
same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 11
Courts open - Redress of injuries
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
Due process of law
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues before the court center on whether the trial court
properly applied the law in ruling that plaintiff's claim of a
common law marriage must be dismissed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
30-1-4.5(2) (1989), and in ruling that defendant is entitled to ask
for attorney fees pursuant to § 78-27-56 (1992).

Questions of law

are reviewed under a correctness of error standard, giving no
deference to the trial court.

Hales v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,

854 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1993); Velarde v. Board of Review, 831
P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992).

The trial court did not hold an

evidentiary hearing, and therefore, all issues presented in this
case are conclusions of law of the trial court.
are

not

entitled

to

deference

and
3

are

Such conclusions

reviewable

for

their

correctness.

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Barbara Lynn Bunch

("Bunch") filed a complaint

against appellee Brian Lynn Englehorn ("Englehorn") alleging a
common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1989)
and asking for relief based on a marital relationship.
filed an answer.

Englehorn

The matter came on for trial more than a year

after Bunch and Englehorn separated.

At trial, counsel for

Englehorn moved the court to dismiss the action pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) because more than a year had elapsed since
the parties' separation.
motion on that basis.

The trial court granted Englehorn's

The court also ruled that Englehorn could

ask for attorney fees pursxiant to § 78-27-56 (1992) on the basis
that Bunch's complaint was filed in bad faith.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In this action, Bunch and Englehorn lived together for a
significant period of time but never married. (Record on Appeal, p.
000001.) After their separation on about August 18, 1990, (Record
on Appeal, p. 000001.) Bunch filed a complaint against Englehorn
alleging a common law marriage and praying for relief based on a
marital relationship. (Record on Appeal, pp. 000001 - 000009.) The
complaint was filed on May 16, 1991, within one year of the
separation. (Record on Appeal, p. 000001.) However, the trial did
not take place until June

2, 1993, beyond
4

one year of the

separation. (Record on Appeal, p. 000090.)

Bunch alleged in her

complaint that the parties had a common law marriage pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (1989). They had an agreement to live
together as man and wife.

Further, both were adults capable of

consenting to marriage and legally capable of marrying who had cohabited, mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations,
and who had held themselves out as husband and wife and acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 000001-000002.)
At trial, counsel for Englehorn moved the court to dismiss the
action on the basis of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1989) which
provides that, "The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship described in
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of
that

relationship."

Englehorn

argued

that

the

parties'

relationship ended on August 18, 1990; that it was now June 2,
1993; and that no determination or establishment of a marriage had
been obtained within one year of the separation. Therefore, the
statute was, as a matter of law, not available to Bunch to pursue
a common law marriage.

(Record on Appeal, p. 000145.)

The court

dismissed the complaint with prejudice and on the merits on the
basis of Englehorn's argument.

It held that the court had no

jurisdiction to grant Bunch a divorce from Englehorn pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1989) because the parties' relationship
had ended over one year prior to trial.
000150-000153.)

(Record on Appeal, pp.

The district court also ruled that Englehorn
5

could, if he desired, seek attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (1992) on the basis that Bunch had filed her complaint
in bad faith.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 000153-000154.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in dismissing Bunch's complaint with
prejudice and on the merits rather than allowing her an evidentiary
hearing. The trial court also erred in ruling that Englehorn could
ask for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992).
The trial court applied the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 30-14.5(2) ("section (2)") which appears to only allow a party one year
after the separation to establish a common law marriage.

As

applied, section 30-1-4.5 is a statute of repose because it begins
to run from an event, the separation of the parties, rather than
from the date of an injury resulting in a cause of action.

As

such, section (2) violates Article I, section 11 of the Utah
Constitution which provides that our courts are open to everyone
for injury done to their person, property, or reputation and shall
provide them with a remedy by due course of law.
court's

application,

section

(2) does

not

Under the trial

allow

a party

a

sufficient opportunity to pursue a common law marriage claim.
Section (2) also violates Article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution in that the short time period deprives Bunch of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.

Bunch was denied

a hearing on her claim because it was not "established" within one
year of the relationships termination, even though the claim had
6

been filed within one year.

The time period is unfair and so

violates her right to due process.

The trial court should have

found that Bunch had one year after the separation to file a
complaint alleging a common law marriage.

The trial court could

have done that by holding that section (2) is a one year statue of
limitations running from the time of the separation, and that by
filing an action within that period, one tolls the requirement that
the marriage relationship be established within one year of the
separation.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
AS APPLIED BY THE LOWER COURT
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5
IS A STATUTE OF REPOSE
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) provides for a common law
marriage as follows:
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a
contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a
solemnized marriage under the provisions of
this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties,
and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have
acquired a uniform and general reputation as
husband and wife.
Section 2 states that:
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship
7

described in Subsection (1), or within one year following
the termination of that relationship.
Evidence of a
marriage
recognizable under this section may be
manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same
general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
The plain wording of Section (2) suggests that a common law
marriage will only be recognized if all the elements of Section (1)
are proven in court within one year after the separation of the
parties.

Viewed in this way, section (2) is a statute of repose

rather than a statute of 1imitations.

The Utah Supreme Court has

distinguished the two:
A statute of repose bars all actions after a specified
period of time has run from the occurrence of some event
other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to
a cause of action. Besrry By and Through Berry v. Beech
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985).
A statute of limitations, on the other hand:
. . . requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified
period of time after a legal right has been violated or
the remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived. Id.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 is then a statute of repose because
the time begins to run from the occurrence of an event, that being
the separation of the parties, rather than from the date of an
injury resulting in a cause of action.

POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION
11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, section 11 of our Utah Constitution states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
8

done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
and civil cause to which he is a party.
In Berry, supra, at 674-76, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
Article I, section 11 in some detail.

It stated:

Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution is part of
the Declaration of Rights.
It declares that an
individual shall have a right to a 'remedy by due course
of law' for injury to 'person, property, or reputation.
. . . . . . . . .

The clear language of the section guarantees access to
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on
fairness and equity. A plain reading of section 11 also
establishes that the framers of the Constitution intended
that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual
rights. A constitutional guarantee of access to the
courthouse was not intended by the founders to be an
empty gesture; individuals are also entitled to a remedy
by 'due course of law' for injuries to 'person, property,
or reputation.'
Necessarily, the Legislature has great latitude in
defining, changing, and modernizing the law, and in doing
so may create new rules of law and abrogate old ones.
Nevertheless, the basic purpose of Article I, section 11
is to impose some limitation on that power for the
benefit of those persons who are injured in their person,
property or reputations since they are generally isolated
in society, belong to no identifiable group, and rarely
are able to rally the political process to their aid.
(citations omitted)
The court also pointed out that section 11 was more than a
mere "philosophical statement."

It was part of a Declaration of

Rights and a "fundamental law of the State" which "makes them
enforceable in a court of law."

Ld. at 676.

The court continued by saying that:
. . . section 11 rights are not always paramount . . .
and must be weighed against and harmonized with other
9

constitutional provisions, . . For example, the right to
protection of a person's reputation must be accommodated
to the right of others to speak freely. . . (In certain
instances), "section 11 interests may, in some cases,
have to yield to the power of the legislature to promote
the public health, safety, morals and welfare.
For
example, the Legislature has abolished certain common law
remedies for personal injuries and substituted other
remedies pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act . .
In sum, section 11 does not recede before every
legislative enactment but neither may it be applied in a
mechanical fashion to strike every statute with which
there may be conflict.
id. at 677, 680. (citations
omitted)
In that a statute of repose cuts off a person's access to the
courts after a stated pejriod of time, it is in conflict with
Article I, section 11 which provides for open access to the courts.
The question is whether the statute of repose may be harmonized
with Article I, section 11.

It requires applying a two-part test

which is set forth in Berry;
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy 'by due course of law' for vindication of his
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the
substitute must be substantially equal in value or other
benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially
comparable substantive protection to one's person,
property, or reputation, although the form of the
substitute remedy may be different.
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may
be justified only if there is a clear social or economic
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means
for achieving the objective.
Ld. at 680. (citations
omitted)
In Berry, the court struck down section 3 of the Utah Products
Liability Act for not meeting the test.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) also fails to meet the test and
10

is unconstitutional. Section (2) requires one seeking to establish
a common law marriage to do so within one year of the separation.
Even with the changes in our court system,
to push a case forward.

it is often difficult

One filing a complaint has no guarantee

when it will ultimately be decided. Therefore, fate may determine
the outcome of a common law marriage case. Many elements must be
proven to establish a common law marriage and that may require a
lengthy period of discovery.
party.

There may be difficulties serving a

Motions by either side may cause significant delays. The

court, counsel, or either party may be unavailable at a critical
stage.

For example, a common law marriage case may be set for

trial eleven and one-half months from the date of separation only
to be continued beyond the one year period due to illness. A plain
reading of the statute would cause a dismissal in that instance.
Another problem is that it generally takes time for parties
involved in a marital type relationship to recover from the effects
of a separation.

Separations can be and often are very traumatic

and even devastating.

It is highly unlikely that a party at the

end of a relationship will be thinking, "The relationship is over.
I better file for a common law marriage."

It often takes an

extensive period for a party to reach the point of thinking clearly
about his or her legal rights.

A party may not even realize

initially that a common law marriage is possible.

The point is

that the common law marriage statute simply does not provide people
like Bunch with reasonable access to the courts as required by
Article I, section 11.
11

Section

(2) is only valid

if it meets the two-part

test

discussed above. The initial question is whether Bunch has another
remedy for establishing a common law marriage.

Bunch does not in

that her only means for establishing a common law marriage is by
meeting the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5.

The best

Bunch has been able to do is to file a separate action to try and
obtain some concessions from Englehorn.

Other claims have been

lost that would have been available in a divorce action.
The

second

establishing
eliminates

a

question
common

a clear

is

law

social

whether

marriage

the
is

or economic

short

justified
evil.

period

for

because

it

common

law

The

marriage statute appears to have the purpose of turning personal
relationships into marriages.

Bunch recognizes that a reasonable

cut-off period is appropriate to prevent people from attempting to
allege a common law marriage long after the relationship has ended,
but she fails to see how the strict period now in place serves to
curtail any social or economic evils.
marriage

In passing the common law

statute, the Legislature made it possible

for people

living together to have the benefit of a marriage contract.

The

legislation helps protect people who have invested time, money and
effort in building a relationship from being left "high and dry" by
their partner.

The problem is that the rapid time period required

for

about

bringing

unreasonable,

as

the

relief

illustrated

intended

above.

Bunch

is

arbitrary

wonders

how

and
many

potential marriages contemplated by the statute have been thwarted
by the requirement of section (2).
12

In Horton v. Gold Miner's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094-95
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court noted that when a legislative
objective:
• . • can only be achieved at the expense of forcing an
injured person to forego a legal remedy, the two
objectives must be balanced against each other to
determine which should prevail, and that balancing has
been done by the open courts clause of the Utah
Constitution,"
"Certainly there is a valid social interest in providing
a time of repose—in wiping the slate clean and not
allowing possible mistakes of the past to becloud an
individual's life forever. The practice of wiping out
past debts is an ancient one, rooted indeed, in Old
Testament times. We do not believe that the open courts
clause necessarily forbids forever and always such
forgiveness of mistake. What it clearly does is make
certain that periods of repose only be allowed when the
possibility of injury and damage has become highly remote
and unexpected. Short of that, injured persons are to be
allowed their remedy.

POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION
7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
The Utah Constitution, Article I, section 7, provides that, ".
. . no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."

The essentials of due process are:

1) The existence of an appropriate tribunal; 2) inquiry
into the merits of the question presented; 3) notice of
the purpose of the inquiry; 4) opportunity to appear in
person or by counsel; 5) fair opportunity to be heard;
and 6) judgment rendered in the record thus made. State
in Interest of L. G. W., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981).
In Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 657 P.2d
1293, 1296 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
13

Neither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a
person a constitutional right or deprive such a person of
a vested interest in property with any opportunity to be
heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without
due process of law.
Many attempts have been made to further define 'due
process' but they all resolve into the thought that a
party shall have his day in court — that is each party
shall have the right to a hearing before a competent
court, with the privilege of being heard and introducing
evidence to establish his cause or his defense, after
which comes judgment upon the record thus made."
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P-2d 199, 20506 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between the
due process requirements in economic as opposed to non-economic
regulatory statutes.

It noted that economic regulatory statutes

must simply be rationally based.

These statutes have:

. . . culminated in a rational basis test so tolerant
that the substantive content of economic statutes rarely
violates due process
In contrast to the test
used to determine the validity of the
economic
regulations
involved
in
the
foregoing
cases, a
termination of parental rights must be tested against a
more stringent standard.
Parental rights (are) fundamental for purposes of due
process. . . . Utah's due process Clause requires a
higher level of scrutiny than is exercised to determine
the validity of economic regulation. By analogy to the
tests employed in judging the validity of alleged
infringements on other fundamental rights, we hold that
the proponent of legislation infringing parental rights
must show (1) a compelling state interest in the result
to be achieved and (2) that the means adopted are
narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose,
(citations omitted)
In this action, Bunch appeared in court on the day set for
trial ready to proceed with her claim of a marriage relationship.
The trial judge dismissed the matter with prejudice and on the
merits

because

over

a

year

had
14

elapsed

since

the

parties

separation• Bunch was precluded from having a hearing on her claim
because of section (2).

The section violated Bunch's right to due

process by requiring her to establish a marital relationship within
one year of her separation.
reason outlined above.

That requirement is unfair for the

As the court stated in Berry, supra, at

672, a statute of limitations " . . . must allow a reasonable time
for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises."
It is further submitted that in order to not violate due
process, section (2) must promote a compelling state interest. The
section pertains to the right to marry which has been held to be a
"natural" right retained by the people. The Utah Supreme Court has
said:
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
declared that '[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly purusit of happiness by free men.'
In Re J. P., 648 P.2 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982).
There is no compelling interest in requiring one to establish
a marriage relationship within a year of the separation.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-1-4.5 AS A ONE YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Englehorn's

argument

that

Bunch's

complaint

should

be

dismissed because a common law marriage was not established within
one year of the separation was raised for the first time on the day
of trial.

The trial court reviewed the statute and applied its
15

plain meaning in ruling in Englehorn's favor.
further

reflection

might

have

drawn

the

It is submitted that
trial

judge

to

the

conclusion that section (2) provides for a one year period after
the separation to file a complaint.

It is submitted that this is

the conclusion that should have been drawn.

Again, section (2)

states that a marriage must be established "during the relationship
or within one year following the termination of the relationship."
It leaves the impression that it is not enough to simply file a
cause of action within one year, but requires that a determination
of the marriage relationship be made by the court within that
period.

That is not reasonable, as illustrated above.

What is

reasonable is to say that one must file a cause of action within
one year of the separation, and that in doing so one tolls the
requirement of proving a common law marriage within that period.

POINT V
THIS IS NOT A PROPER
CASE FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Utah Code Ann. section 78-27-56 (1992) provides that:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action as
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith,
except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but
only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of
impecuniosity in the action before the court;
or
16

(b) the court enters in the record the reason
for not awarding fees under the provisions of
Subsection (1).
The court in this matter took no evidence and made no findings
that Bunch filed her complaint in bad faith or that her complaint
had no merit.

The court simply dismissed Bunch's complaint with

prejudice and on the merits on the basis the statute of limitations
had run.

Englehorn filed no counterclaim.

It is the view of Bunch

that once the complaint was dismissed Englehorn's answer went with
it.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted
that the decision of the trial court to dismiss Bunch's complaint
with prejudice and on the merits based on section (2) of Utah Code
Ann.

30-1-4.5 was in err.

The trial court should have found

section (2) to be a one year statute of limitations from the time
of

the

parties

interpreted

as

separation.
a

statute

of

Otherwise,

section

repose

unconstitutional

and

(2) must

be
for

violating Article I, section 11 and Article I, section 7 of our
Utah Constitution. The order of the trial court dismissing Bunch's
complaint with prejudice should be reversed and the trial court
instructed to set the matter for trial on Bunch's complaint and
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Englehorn's answer,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
1994

By: Stephen W.
Attorney at La

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^

day of

1994, I delivered two true and correct copy//6f the BRIEF OF
APPELLANT BARBARA LYNN BUNCH: to Willard Bishop, Attorney for
Appellee, 36 North 300 West, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah 847210279.
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Defendant
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483

IRON COUNTY
^pp
BY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN
CONNECTION WITH MOTION
TO DISMISS
Civil No. 914900057
Honorable J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable J. Philip Eves,
District Judge for trial on Wednesday, June 2, 1993. Plaintiff BARBARA LYNN BUNCH
appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Floyd W. Holm.
Defendant BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN also appeared personally, and was represented
by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Floyd W. Holm,
made an opening statement. Defendant's attorney, Mr. Willard R. Bishop, also made an
opening statement. Following opening statement, counsel for Defendant, Willard R.
Bishop, moved to dismiss based upon the provisions of UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as
amended), asserting that based upon the opening statement of Plaintiff's counsel, which

OOOlOo

could be assumed to be true only for purposes of argument, the case should be
dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits.

Argument was had. After having

questioned counsel and having reviewed Plaintiff's Verified Complaint for purposes of
Defendant's oral motion to dismiss, the Court accepted -as true the following facts
presented in Plaintiff's pleadings and oraLto be true for purposes of argument: and
therefore, makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff's Complaint was signed by counsel on February 20, 1991, was

verified by Plaintiff on March 14, 1991, and was filed on May 16, 1991.
2.

Thereafter, Defendant Brian L Engelhorn was served with process on or

about June 25, 1991.
3.

The parties began living together in March, 1979, in Brian Head, Iron

County, Utah, and continued to live together until August 18, 1990.
4.

Following the filing and service of this action, and within one year of

termination of the relationship Plaintiff failed to obtain any court or administrative order
establishing that the relationship between the parties constituted a marriage which was
not solemnized, arising out of a contract between two consenting parties who were
capable of giving consent, were legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under
the provisions of Chapter 1 of Title 30, Utah Code Annotated, who had cohabited, who

2

mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations, and who held themselves out
as and acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
5.

The Utah State Legislature adopted UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), in

1987, which statute became effective in April or May of 1987. The exact effective date
of this statute is not necessary to the Court's decision below.
6.

UCA 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), provides that the determination or

establishment of a marriage under UCA 30-1 -4,5 (1953, as amended), must occur during
the relationship described in UCA 30-1-4.5(1), or within one year following the
termination of that relationship. Since the relationship ended August 18, 1990, and no
determination or decree was obtained within one year, as a matter of law, the statute is
not applicable.
7.

The cases cited hold that UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), cannot be

applied retroactively, and on several occasions, the Utah Court of Appeals has
invalidated and reversed rulings of trial courts which attempted to apply the statute
retroactively.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The provisions of UCA 30-1 -4.5 (1953, as amended), cannot be applied to

the "relationship" of these parties to give rise to a valid, statutory unsolemnized marriage.
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2.

Since the effective date of UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), the Utah

Court of Appeals has interpreted this statute in various reported cases, including Mattes
v. Olearain. 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988); Lavton v. Lavton. 777 P.2d 504 (Utah App.
1989); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991); and Van Per Stappn v. Van Per
Stappn. 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah, App. 1991).
3.

This Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested

by Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, in which Verified Complaint she seeks a divorce from
Pefendant.
4.

Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed, with prejudice and upon the

merits.
5.

Should Pefendant seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to the

provisions of UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as amended), he should be permitted to do so in the
form of an appropriate motion, in order to allow Plaintiff opportunity to respond.
PATEP this

T~

day of

{0fj£ff6-o^

. 1993.

BY THE COURT:
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Defendant

FLOYD W. HOLM
Attorney for Plaintiff
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FILED
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

'93 OCT 12 RH 10 36
IRON COUNTY
BY

WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801)586-9483

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN,
Defendant.

)
)
)

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

)
)
)

Civil No. 914900057
Honorable J. Philip Eves

The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable J. Philip Eves,
District Judge for non-jury trial on Wednesday, June 2, 1993. Plaintiff BARBARA LYNN
BUNCH appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Floyd
W. Holm. Defendant BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN also appeared personally, and was
represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Opening statements were
made. Following the opening statements, Defendant's counsel moved to dismiss the
action, based upon the opening statement made by Plaintiff's counsel. Argument was

00011,)

had. The Court having considered argument, and having reviewed Plaintiff's pleadings
and having accepted as true the pleadings and opening statement of counsel. The
Court treats Defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment on
undisputed facts as plead and stated upon such facts for purposes of argument in
connection with its decision related to said motion to dismiss, although Defendant
disputed certain of the allegations made by Plaintiff's counsel, and having made its
findings of fact based upon said assumptions for the purposes of argument and
disposition of the motion to dismiss made verbally by Plaintiff's counsel, and having
entered its conclusions of law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's Complaint in this action should be and it hereby is,

dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, for the reason that no court or
administrative order was ever obtained establishing the parties' relationship as a
marriage within the required time limits.
2.

That should Defendant desired to claim attorney fees pursuant to UCA

78-27-56 (1953, as amended), he may do so through the filing of an appropriate motion,
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with appropriate supporting affidavit and memorandum, in order to give Plaintiff ample
opportunity to respond.
DATED this

(

- day
. of

C^rX^Cc^
_

. 1993.

BY THE COURT:

J. PHILIP EVES, District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Defendant

FLOYD W. HOLM
Attorney for Plaintiff
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